We study incentive design in an agency setting when monitoring is costly, and this cost is endogenously determined by the contract structure. A firm employs multiple workers to obtain costly unverifiable information about an unknown state (a task) and report it to the firm. The firm uses peer-monitoring to incentivize workers by hiring multiple workers and conditioning payment upon how a worker's message compares to the messages of other workers. We place two key restrictions on the contract space: workers are protected by limited liability and the firm cannot commit to truthfully reveal whether a worker was monitored (partial commitment). We derive the firm's optimal contract under both full and partial commitment. The optimal contracts exhibits three key features: (i) the structure of the optimal monitoring technology depends crucially on the commitment power of the firm -virtual monitoring, or monitoring with arbitrarily small probability, is optimal under full commitment while stochastic monitoring, or monitoring with strictly positive probability, is optimal under partial commitment; (ii) bundling -simultaneously assigning a worker multiple tasks -reduces worker rents and monitoring inefficiencies; and (iii) approximate efficiency is achievable under full commitment but not under partial commitment. We conclude with an application to contract design on crowdsourcing platforms such as Mechanical Turk, and characterize the optimal contract for simple tasks found on these platforms, such as moderating the content of user-generated images or advertisements.
Introduction
Technological advancement is changing the way modern companies interact with their workforce. New information technology creates the opportunity for firms to access a flexible and inexpensive pool of workers on-demand. One example is crowdsourcing, where firms hire temporary workers through open calls online. Millions of potential employees are available around the clock and able to start work immediately. Neither a preexisting relationship nor a continuing relationship is required. Much of the allure of spot labor markets is that interaction between the firm and its employees is minimal. But in the absence of conventional methods of supervising employees, tapping into this global workforce presents a host of new incentive issues. Workers are compensated for their effort, but the exertion of effort is unobservable and the output of a worker provides no direct signal about whether effort was exerted. The firm must guard against shirking, but how?
We study the challenges faced by a firm hiring in a spot market when monitoring is costly, and this cost is endogenously determined by the structure of contracts. The firm would like to delegate a series of tasks to workers. Each task has an unknown state that the worker can observe if he exerts costly effort. The firm seeks to learn this unknown state. Workers' payoffs are independent of the state, effort is non-contractible, and workers' messages about the state are costly to verify. Specifically, the cost of verifying a message is endogenously determined by the cost of hiring additional workers to complete the same task. Comparing messages across workers produces a signal of effort. Incentives are generated by conditioning payment upon how a worker's message compares to the messages of other workers. We refer to this as peermonitoring. Each worker is offered a contract consisting of tasks to be completed, a monitoring protocol specifying a probability distribution over how many workers are hired for each task, and a payment schedule. Workers are protected by limited liability in that the firm cannot punish workers by assessing penalties for poor performance; the most severe punishment is withholding wages. 1
Another strategic issue inherent in this type of setting relates to the incentives of the firm.
If the firm does not have full commitment power to implement a given contract, it may have an incentive to deviate from this contract to a different wage structure or monitoring distribution.
For example, a worker does not observe the messages of other workers assigned to the same task. Therefore, if the firm can hide the messages of other workers and pay the worker a lower wage, it will do so. There are many types of commitment issues that arise on behalf of the firm. We focus on a simple departure from full commitment in which the firm cannot commit to truthfully reveal whether a worker was monitored. Specifically, the firm can hide messages by a worker's peers, but cannot fabricate the content of these messages (messages from other workers are verifiable). We compare this partial commitment setting to a full commitment setting in which the firm can commit to truthfully reveal when a worker is monitored and examine the role of commitment in structuring incentives Our main result is to derive the firm's optimal contract under full and partial commitment.
The optimal contracts exhibits three key features: the structure of the optimal monitoring technology depends crucially on the commitment power of the firm, bundling -simultaneously assigning a worker multiple tasks -reduces worker rents and the inefficiency that arises from monitoring, and approximate efficiency is achievable under full commitment but not under partial commitment.
The analysis divides the firm's problem into three stages. First, we derive the structure of the optimal wage profile. We show that when the firm has full commitment, the worker bears the risk of monitoring in the sense that the firm will pay a positive wage only on the subset of reports on which the worker is monitored and matches on every task, and otherwise pays a wage of zero. In contrast, if the firm has partial commitment, then the firm will pay on all reports that occur with positive probability under high effort. In either case, the worker earns rents on every message that is sent on the equilibrium path, and these rents are higher for messages that correspond to less likely states. In other words, the worker is paid a bonus for identifying unlikely events.
Second, we characterize the optimal monitoring technology. Monitoring is costly for the firm, and the cost of this monitoring is determined endogenously by the structure of the contract. If the firm has full commitment, then in the optimal contract, the expected wage payment to a worker is independent of the monitoring rate. Therefore, monitoring at a higher rate increases the expected number of workers hired, but does not affect the expected payment per worker. In this case, virtual monitoring, or monitoring with arbitrarily low probability, is optimal for the firm. The optimal contract is approximately efficient, since duplication occurs with arbitrarily small probability. However, workers still capture rents.
On the other hand, if the firm has partial commitment, the expected wage payment for a single worker is decreasing in the monitoring probability. The firm faces a trade-off between efficiency and worker rents: monitoring at a higher rate reduces the expected wage payment, and therefore the rent, to each worker, but increases the expected number of workers hired, and therefore the efficiency loss. Stochastic monitoring, or monitoring with strictly positive probability, emerges as the optimal monitoring rate for the firm. 2 The firm finds it optimal to incur some inefficiency in order to reduce the rents paid to workers. Therefore, tasks are duplicated with positive probability and the optimal contract is inefficient. In this case, bundling both reduces this inefficiency and worker rents.
Third, we look at how the ability of the firm to bundle, or group multiple tasks together for a single worker, impacts the optimal contract. Bundling ties the worker's wage for one task to his performance on all tasks, which partially relaxes the limited liability constraint by allowing the firm to punish a worker on multiple tasks when he deviates on one. Under both partial and full commitment, this reduces the rents captured by the workers. Therefore, the firm finds it optimal to bundle tasks together. Under partial commitment, bundling also reduces the optimal monitoring rate, which reduces the inefficiency that arises from monitoring. Monitoring and bundling are strategic substitutes: the firm hires monitors less frequently as the number of tasks assigned to an agent increases. The efficiency loss relative to the contractible effort benchmark vanishes asymptotically.
Finally, we show that symmetric peer-to-peer monitoring outperforms other types of monitoring, such as inserting known tasks into the pool (referred to as the Gold Standard in crowdsourcing markets) or constructing a hierarchy of monitors by designating some workers as monitors whose sole responsibility is to check the work of others. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) suggest that there should be specialization in monitoring. This is not the case in our setting:
the optimal incentive organization of the firm treats workers symmetrically.
Finally, we develop an application to an online crowdsourcing marketplace in which the firm offers a binary contract that takes the form of either accepting or rejecting a worker's output.
Spot markets for labor are already big business: in crowdsourcing, where firms and workers interact through the web, worker earnings are in the billions, the revenues of vendors matching firms to workers were estimated at $500 million in 2009 (Frei 2009 ) and venture capital firms injected almost $300 million in 2011 (Sanders 2011) . It is not surprising that industry insiders believe one-third of the global workforce could be hired online by 2020 (Vanham 2012) . The mechanisms we identify offer potentially significant improvement over those currently in practice. Firm can reduce their monitoring expenditures by structuring contracts so that individual workers check each other. By shifting from piece-rate payment schedules to schemes requiring satisfactory performance on all tasks, firms can recreate the same incentives at lower cost.
The theoretical performance improvements can be empirically tested through field experiments carried out online.
The main findings of the paper apply to other settings as well. For example, considering a multidimensional chore instead of a series of tasks, the firm monitors individual components of the chore and punishes workers across all dimensions for poor performance on any dimension. Tax auditing practices, hiring rules-of-thumb and the monitoring of rider provisions are examples of the main ideas of the paper applied to this setting.
The paper proceeds as follows. Related literature is discussed in Section 1 and a representative example is presented in Section 2. The formal model is introduced in Section 3, while Section 4 derives the firm's optimal contract under partial and full commitment. Extensions follow in Section 6, while Section 5 develops an application to crowdsourcing labor markets.
Appendix A contains a brief overview of a the crowdsourcing marketplace.
Literature. In the standard agency model, an agent's action is not observable and he is subject to moral hazard. The firm observes an informative signal about an agent's action and uses this signal to generate incentives by conditioning payment on the realization of the signal. 3 Actions and signals can be interpreted broadly; the action profile that the principal seeks to enforce is often an optimal level of investment or effort, while signals represent output or peer evaluations. As long as the distribution of the signal varies with the chosen action profile, the firm is able to align incentives so that the employee is willing to choose the prescribed action profile. 4 The characterization of optimal contracts in the general setting is limited. 5 Instead, the literature provides a host of elegant solutions for specific settings. Many of the mechanisms identified are variations on a common dynamic. Suppose the principal wishes to implement action a * . If for each action a there exists a signal s such that p(s|a * ) = p(s|a), the firm is able to statistically discriminate between actions. When s is realized, the firm inserts a wedge until a is no longer attractive. Bad signals -those that are more frequent when a is taken instead of a * -are punished while good signals are rewarded.
If the firm is in a multilateral contracting environment, issues arise with statistically distinguishing deviations by individual agents. If the signal only reveals aggregate information about the actions of the group, and not information about individual action choices, the principal must guard against a free-rider problem. Holmstrom (1982) emphasizes the role of group penalties: all workers are punished whenever bad signals obtain. Group penalties are natural here since the firm cannot discern which worker deviated. They continue to play a role elsewhere, especially when identifying the deviator is more costly than identifying that a deviation occurred.
A practical, though not theoretical, complication arises if the conditional distribution of the signal following two action profiles is very similar. In order to dissuade deviations, the firm must impose a large punishment when a deviation is detected, as this happens with low probability. Larger and larger punishments are required as the signals triggering punishment become more rare.
This contract with large punishments break down if the firm faces limited liability and is restricted in how severely it can punish an employee. A solution is that instead of punishing a worker by paying him −x < 0 when a bad signal obtains, the firm transfers x to the worker at the outset and simply takes away this transfer upon observing a bad signal. Such an arrangement preserves incentives, so if the contract without limited liability is able to induce a desired action profile, then so is the modified contract satisfying limited liability. But the firm's expected payments have now increased by x and the worker captures large rents. In this case, hiring workers may no longer be attractive at all.
A general property of standard agency models is that the principal cannot achieve the firstbest equilibrium obtained when actions are contractible. Correlation in agents' valuations or information provides a way for the principal to recover first-best. 6 Viewed in isolation, an agent's action or signal thereof is uninformative about the underlying uncertainty. But viewed in conjunction with those of other agents, the principal is able to draw inferences about the hidden object. Legros and Matthews (1993) study a partnership problem between the poles of individual and aggregate signals. Each partner privately devotes effort to a common project. Provided agents are not protected by limited liability clauses, the principal can approximate the efficient outcome in a deterministic output setting by instructing one worker to shirk via selecting an extreme action a i ∈ {a i , a i } with small probability while the other agents select their components of a * −i with certainty. Still maintaining limited liability, the efficient outcome can be implemented exactly when at least one non-shirker can be identified following any unilateral deviation. The idea here is for the other agents to pay a fine to the known non-shirker when a deviation from a * is observed. Unlike Holmstrom (1982) , these outcomes can be attained without resort to a budget breaker.
The signal is commonly produced without cost as a byproduct of action choices. 7 In this respect, Legros and Matthews (1993) is an example of costly monitoring. Rahman (2012) also considers a costly monitoring setting; in an ideal arrangement, a worker exerts effort and the firm never monitors the worker. This would be the action profile with contractible effort. When payments cannot be made contingent on actions -perhaps because actions are unobservable -this profile cannot be achieved. Rahman (2012) shows that the profile can be approximated arbitrarily well by using the dynamic described earlier. The signal s is now the report of a monitor periodically hired to verify the worker's action. 8 The worker is punished severely whenever the monitor reports that he shirked.
The signal structure can be viewed as the firm's monitoring technology. In much of the literature, regardless of whether signals are a costless byproduct of actions, the monitoring technology is exogenous. Early studies in which monitoring is a choice variable include Becker (1968) , Kolm (1973) and Mirrlees (1974) ; 9 these papers suggest combining infinitesimal monitoring with arbitrarily harsh punishments.
The observed incentive structures of firms bear little resemblance to these arrangements (Dickens, Katz, Lang, and Summers 1989) . Even if arbitrarily harsh punishments are possible in practice, they may still be undesirable since they flatten the penalty gradient between minor and major offenses (Stigler 1970) . Becker and Stigler (1974), Carr-Hill and Stern (1979) and Carmichael (1985) provide other reasons to question the appropriateness of unlimited liability. This paper identifies the optimal incentive organization for a firm (i ) bound by limited liability and in the absence of repeated interactions and (ii ) in a setting where costly monitoring is necessary to produce informative signals. Punishments entail taking away rents when a deviation from a * is observed. The punishments are strengthened by tying the payment for one part of the job to performance on all parts of the job. This dynamic is similar to that identified by Fuchs (2007) in a repeated setting; there, Fuchs (2007) shows it is optimal for the firm to withhold payment until the final period. 10
Example
Users upload thousands of images to an auction website each day. The website moderator needs to ensure the images meet certain guidelines, and has access to a large online labor market.
Workers moderate content by viewing the images and reporting to the moderator. This process takes time, the cost of which is 0.02 per image, but accurately reveals objectionable content.
Multiple images can be packaged and sent to a worker as a job. The moderator limits each job to a maximum of 10 images, to ensure approval of listings within a reasonable time frame.
Workers and the moderator know that most images are acceptable: 95% meet guidelines. The risk-neutral moderator earns a payoff of 1 for correctly classifying an image (i.e., forbidding obscene content or approving acceptable content) and a payoff of 0 otherwise, less any payment to workers. Risk-neutral workers do not care whether the moderator treats an image correctly: payoffs are wages less the cost of effort.
If the moderator could observe whether a worker viewed the image, he would simply pay the worker his cost of effort, 0.02, for each image viewed and nothing for skipped images. There is no need to hire multiple workers for a single image and no benefit (through reduced wages) to assigning multiple images to a single worker. Workers earn no surplus.
More realistically, the moderator cannot observe whether a worker viewed the image. The moderator must design a monitoring technology to prevent workers from shirking and fabricating messages. If the moderator assigns the same image to two workers, it can compare their messages. Denote the probability that an image in a worker's job is assigned to a second worker as q.
We identify how the moderator optimally structures incentives under several different restrictions on the contracting environment. A contract consists of the number of images in a job, a payment scheme and a monitoring technology.
Benchmark: Unlimited Liability and Full Commitment. As a benchmark, suppose the moderator has full commitment and no restrictions on the payment scheme. The optimal transfer is to pay a worker 0.02 unless a second worker is hired and their messages mismatch, in which case the worker pays a penalty of 0.02(1−1/.05q). Given this transfer scheme, the worker exerts high effort for any q > 0. In expectation, the moderator hires 1 + q workers per image and compensates each at their cost of effort. As q → 0, the moderator hires approximately one worker and this has no effect on the expected transfer per worker. Thus, virtual monitoring, or monitoring with arbitrarily small probability, is optimal. The optimal contract is approximately efficient and workers earn no surplus. Again, there is no benefit to assigning multiple images to a single worker.
Limited Liability and Full Commitment. Suppose that the moderator cannot threaten workers with negative wage payments. In any contract that offers a positive wage for at least one possible message, the worker can earn a positive expected payoff by shirking and fabricating a message. Thus, if the contract provides incentives for the worker to view the image, the worker will capture a premium above his cost of effort. 11 Suppose a worker is assigned a single image, and this image is assigned to a second worker with probability q > 0. In the optimal payment scheme, a worker is paid if and only if a second agent is hired and their messages match; otherwise, the worker is paid nothing. The worker bears the risk of monitoring, in the sense that he is paid only when he is monitored. This is a new feature under limited liability; with unlimited liability, there is no benefit to having workers bear the risk of monitoring.
Consider the optimal monitoring probability. The probability that the worker meets the criteria for payment is q, which yields an expected wage payment per worker of .02 × 2. This is independent of the monitoring probability q: although a lower monitoring rate increases the required wage conditional on payment, it also reduces the probability of payment. These two effects exactly offset each other, yielding an expected wage payment per worker that is independent of q. Therefore, the optimal monitoring probability minimizes the expected number of workers hired. As q decreases, fewer workers are monitored and therefore meet the criteria for payment. Once again, virtual monitoring is optimal, and the optimal contract is approximately efficient. The moderator's expected payments approach (1 + ε) × 0.02 × 2 ≈ 0.04, so workers still capture significant rents.
The moderator can improve upon the single image contract by assigning multiple images to workers. Suppose a worker is assigned 10 images and each image is independently assigned to a second worker with probability q > 0. In the optimal payment scheme, a worker is paid if and only if a second agent is hired and their messages match on every assigned task, otherwise, the worker is paid nothing. Virtual monitoring remains optimal, and the moderator's expected payments per image approach 0.02 × 2 10 /(2 10 − 1) ≈ 0.02. Bundling, or assigning a worker multiple images, significantly reduces the rents captured by workers. By assigning multiple images to each worker, the moderator is able to tie a worker's compensation on one task to successful completion of all tasks. This effectively mitigates the costly effect of limited liability protection.
Limited Liability and Partial Commitment. Suppose the firm has partial commitment, and can hide messages. This means that a worker must be paid a weakly higher wage for any report that can be generated by hiding some or all of the messages of other workers who complete the same task. The moderator now faces a trade-off between efficiency and worker rents. Increasing monitoring reduces efficiency, but also lowers the gains to shirking, and therefore, the rents captured by workers. At the optimum, the moderator's cost per image is just below 0.10, which is significantly higher than in the full commitment contract. The monitor chooses a strictly interior monitoring probability, which leads to inefficient duplication of tasks.
Once again, bundling is beneficial; under partial commitment, it significantly reduces both the rents captured by workers and the inefficiency of monitoring.
Model

Set-up
A firm is faced with a countably infinite stream of independent and identical tasks t = 1, 2, ... and can delegate tasks to a countably infinite pool of workers i = 1, 2, .... A task can be assigned to multiple workers, and multiple tasks can be assigned to a single worker. We use the phrase worker-task to refer to a worker's decision problem on a single task. The following convention is maintained: objects pertaining to tasks are subscripted and objects pertaining to workers are superscripted. The Task. Each task t has an unknown state ω t drawn from finite set Ω with common prior belief π ∈ ∆(Ω). The firm can hire workers to learn about the state. Let n t ∈ N ∪ {0} denote the number of workers hired for task t, where N = {1, ..., N } for some N > 2, and let I t be the ordered set containing the identities of these workers. Workers do not observe the number or identity of other workers hired for a task.
A worker i assigned to task t chooses an effort level e i t ∈ {0, 1}. Exerting effort (e=1) perfectly reveals the state and is costly; we normalize this cost to c = 1. No effort (e=0) yields no information about the state and is costless. Let s i t ∈ S := Ω ∪ {∅} be the information worker i observes about task t. Effort choices are unobservable by the firm and information is not verifiable. After making an effort choice and observing information about the state, the worker sends a message to the firm, m i t ∈ S. Upon receiving messages from all hired workers on a task, the firm compiles a task-message profile,
where M := ∪ N n=1 S n is the set of all possible task-message profiles. After observing m t , the firm chooses action A t ∈ Ω. It receives a payoff of v > 1 if its action matches the state and zero otherwise.
The Contract. The firm designs contracts to offer to workers. A contract C consists of a set of tasks J = {t j } J j=1 of size J, a monitoring technology Q and a wage structure W .
We refer to J as the job size, and restrict the maximum job size J < ∞ to capture exogenous legal or technological constraints faced by the firm. A contract has bundling if it has multiple tasks, J ≥ 2.
Workers are monitored by comparing their messages to the messages of other workers assigned to the same task, which we refer to as peer-monitoring. The monitoring technology is the set of probability distributions over the number of workers hired for each task t j in a worker's job, Q = (Q j ) t j ∈J where Q j ∈ ∆(N ). Let q j = N n=2 Q j (n) denote the monitoring rate on task j and let q = (q 1 , ..., q J ) be the monitoring rate for the contract.
The wage structure depends on the worker's message profile, as well as the messages from other workers for the tasks in the worker's job. The firm aggregates the task-message profiles for all tasks in J into a job-message profile, or report r = (m t j ) t j ∈J ∈ R for the worker, where R := M J . It then chooses a reportr ∈ R to reveal to the worker, and conditions payment on this revealed report, W : R → R. We assume that workers are protected by limited liability.
We consider two commitment environments for the firm with respect to the report that the firm reveals to the worker. Under full commitment, the firm can commit to truthfully reveal the report.
Condition 2 (Full Commitment).
For any report r ∈ R, the firm can commit to reveal r.
Under partial commitment, messages are verifiable but the firm cannot commit to revealing all messages. In other words, the firm can withhold messages but it cannot fabricate messages.
We say that a reportr ⊂ r ifr can be constructed by removing messages from r. 12 Condition 3 (Partial Commitment). For any report r ∈ R, the firm can commit to reveal a report in the set {r|r ⊆ r}. This is a realistic assumption if the messages from other workers are verifiable but the burden of proof lies on the firm to produce these messages. For example, a report that contains a mismatch on a task is verifiably different from a report with no mismatch, and thus the firm can produce evidence to distinguish these reports. But a report with one message is not verifiably different from a report with two messages, as the firm could hide the message from the second agent.
Partial commitment limits the wage structures that are credible for the firm to offer. If r ⊂ r, it is not credible for the firm to pay a lower wage onr than r, as the firm would simply reveal reportr when it observes r in order to pay the lower wage. Therefore, the firm faces credibility constraint
There is no analogue when the firm has full commitment, as any wage structure is credible.
Let C denote the set of feasible contracts that satisfy limited liability. The firm chooses a contract C = (J, Q, W ) ∈ C, fills the job with J worker-tasks and assigns it to the next available worker. Workers are identical and anonymous, so there is no strategic element to matching workers and job contracts.
Denote worker i's contract by C i = J i , Q i , W i , his effort profile for the job as e i = (e i t ) t∈J i ∈ {0, 1} J i , his signal profile as s i = (s i t ) t∈J i ∈ S J i and his job-message profile that contains his messages as m i = (m i t ) t∈J i ∈ S J i , where S J i = {Ω ∪ ∅} J i is the set of all possible signal profiles. Given job size J, let Π J (s) = π(s 1 )π(s 2 )...π(s J ) denote the probability of signal profile s of length J.
The Worker's Problem.
Strategies. Fix contract C i for worker i. The worker's strategy specifies a distribution over effort profiles, σ i ∈ ∆({0, 1} J i ) and a map from the set of signal profiles to a distribution over message profiles, µ i : S J i → ∆(S J i ). 13 Abusing notation, let σ i t be the probability that worker i exerts effort on task t. Denote the set of all strategy profiles for player i by Σ i .
We define two strategies that play a prominent role in the analysis. Let (σ i , µ i ) denote the strategy profile corresponding to exerting effort on all tasks, e i = 1, and reporting information truthfully, µ i (s) = s ∀s ∈ S J i , and let (σ 0 , m) denote the strategy profile corresponding to exerting effort on no tasks, e i = 0, and reporting message m, µ i (∅, ..., ∅) = m.
Payoffs. The worker is risk-neutral and her payoff depends on the wage payment and cost of effort. Given revealed report r i and effort profile e i , the payoff from the contract is
Note it is independent of the firm's action and the state. Given contract C i , a worker captures rents if his expected payoff is strictly positive.
Incentives. We are interested in equilibria in which workers exert high effort and report truthfully on all tasks, and the firm truthfully reveals the actual report. In such an equilibrium, a worker's incentives are governed by the probability distribution over his reports and the payment for each report, but are independent of the other workers' contracts. Conditional on other workers exerting effort and reporting truthfully, the distribution over reports depends on the worker's strategy, the monitoring distribution and the distribution over the state space.
Let g : Σ i → ∆R be the probability measure induced over reports when other workers play (σ −i , µ −i ), where g(r|σ i , µ i ) is the probability of report r when worker i chooses strategy σ i , µ i .
13 It is without loss of generality to define the message strategy independent of the effort profile, since a worker's information profile fully reveals his effort profile.
The incentive constraint for worker
Accepting the contract is individually rational if the expected payment is weakly greater than the cost of effort,
3.3 The Firm's Problem Strategies. At the task level, the firm must decide how many workers to hire and an action choice, while at the worker level, the firm must decide how to design each contract. A task strategy is a distribution over the number of workers to hire for each task, η t ∈ ∆(N ∪ {0}), and a map from the set of message profiles to the set of distributions over the action choice for each task, α t : M → ∆(Ω). A task strategy delegates if η t (0) = 0 ∀t. We restrict attention to stationary task strategies η in which η t = η for all t. This is without loss of generality, as every non-stationary task strategy has a payoff-equivalent stationary task strategy, given that tasks are symmetric and hiring multiple workers provides no additional information about the state.
A contract strategy for the firm is a distribution over the set of feasible contracts, γ i ∈ ∆(C).
We restrict attention to stationary finite contract strategies γ in which γ i = γ for all i and γ(C) > 0 for a finite number of contracts. This is without loss of generality, given that workers are identical.
Monitoring Consistency. The monitoring technology for a contract depends on the number of workers hired for each task in the contract. Therefore, the firm's choice of monitoring technology is linked to the firm's task strategy η. Hiring n workers for a task creates n workertasks. Given a stationary strategy η, the probability that a worker-task is a task that has been assigned to n workers is η(n)n/ N n=1 η(n)n, where the denominator is the expected number of workers hired for a task. The monitoring consistency condition requires that the firm's contract strategy is consistent with the number of worker-tasks generated by the firm. Given strategy η, the condition places a joint restriction on the set of monitoring technologies and the frequency with which the firm offers each monitoring technology. To simplify notation, we exposit the consistency condition for task strategies with η(n) = 0 for n > 2 (we establish that this is optimal in Lemma 1).
Condition 4 (Monitoring Consistency). Given stationary task strategy η with η(1) = 1 − p and η(2) = p, a stationary finite contract strategy γ is consistent if
and Q j (n) = 0 for all n > 2 and j = 1, ..., J.
The following two examples provide intuition for this condition.
Example 1. Suppose that the firm plays task strategy η(1) = 1 − p and η(2) = p and offers a single contract with the same monitoring technology for all tasks. The consistency condition requires Q(2) = 2p 1 + p and Q(1) = 1 − Q(2). For example, if the firm hires two workers for a task with probability 1/2, (η(1), η(2)) = (1/2, 1/2), in expectation this generates three worker-tasks for every two tasks and two of these three worker-tasks are assigned to two workers. From a worker's perspective, the probability that the task has been assigned to a second worker is 2/3 and the probability that it has only been assigned to the current worker is 1/3. Consistency requires that this contract sets Q(2) = 2/3. Example 2. Suppose the firm offers two symmetric contracts. In contract C A , workers are monitored with probability Q A (2) = 1/2 and in contract C B , 'supervisors" check a subset of the tasks completed by contract C A workers, and therefore know their tasks has been assigned to two workers with probability Q B (2) = 1. More than two workers are never hired. Consistency requires that C A is offered with probability γ(C A ) = 2/3 and C B is offered with probability
Given a stationary finite contract strategy, there is a unique stationary task strategy η that satisfies Condition 4 (the converse is not true). Therefore, we can restrict attention to characterizing the firm's optimal contract strategy, and the stationary task strategy that is consistent with this contract strategy follows from Condition 4.
Payoffs. The firm's payoff on a task depends on whether its action matches the realized state of the world and the payments to workers. The payoff from delegating task t to set of workers I t , offering contracts {C i } i∈It , receiving reports {r i } i∈It and choosing action A t is
where W i (r i )/J i is the per-task payment for a worker hired for task t. This ensures that payments are not double-counted across tasks. 14 We assume that the firm places lexicographic weight on the job size: if two contracts result in the same payoff per task for the firm, it chooses the contract with the smaller job size. This is for expositional convenience to highlight when bundling yields a strict improvement for the firm.
Contract Design. The firm offers a set of contracts to maximize its expected per task payoff, subject to the workers' incentive and individual rationality constraints, limited liability, monitoring consistency, and under partial commitment, the firm's credibility constraint. The firm solves
subject to IC and IR for all i, Conditions 1 and 4, and under partial commitment, CC. In this framework, the decision to not delegate any tasks corresponds to setting J i = 0 and
for all i and I t = ∅ for all t.
We define several types of monitoring in the context of the optimal contract. Let Q(ε) = {Q|q j ≥ ε ∀j} be the set of monitoring structures with a monitoring rate of at least ε on each task. We say that virtual monitoring is optimal if, for any ε > 0, when the firm is restricted to the set of contracts with monitoring structures in Q(ε), the optimal contract sets q j = ε for all j = 1, ..., J. Stochastic monitoring is optimal if there exists an ε > 0 such that when the firm is restricted to the set of contracts with monitoring structures in Q(ε), the optimal contract sets q j > ε for all j = 1, ..., J.
First-best solution
As a benchmark, suppose that effort is observable. The surplus from delegating a task to a worker equals the value of learning the correct state minus the cost of effort, v − 1. If the firm does not hire a worker, it chooses the action corresponding to the most likely state, which yields an expected surplus ofπv, whereπ = max ω π(ω) is the probability of the most likely state.
Thus, the first-best task strategy is to delegate to a single worker if v − 1 >πv and to not 14 It may seem more natural to define the firm's payoff on a self-contained block of tasks and workers, in which all workers in the block are assigned to tasks in the block and vice versa. For any monitoring technology, job size and monitoring technology with η(n) ∈ Q ∀n, it is possible to form such a block. Choose T tasks such that the number of worker-tasks, T N n=1 η(n)n, and the number of workers, I = T N n=1 η(n)n/J, are integers. For example, if η(1) = η(2) = 1/2 and J = 10, setting T = 20 generates 30 worker-tasks to be completed by I = 3 workers. The firm's payoff on this block is
Maximizing the expected payoff per task is equivalent to maximizing the expected payoff per block. Thus it is valid to define the firm's objective function in terms of the per task payoff.
delegate otherwise,
The first-best strategy never involves delegating the task to multiple workers, η(n) = 0 for all n ≥ 2. We assume that delegation is efficient.
Assumption 1 (Delegation is efficient). Assume v > 1/(1 −π).
Under this assumption, the first-best contract has no bundling (J = 1), no monitoring (Q j (1) = 1 and Q j (n) = 0 for all n > 2 and j = 1, ..., J) and pays the worker his cost of effort if he exerts effort. Workers do not earn rents.
Discussion of Model
Duplicating Tasks. There is no learning justification for hiring multiple workers in this paper. Hiring multiple agents is for incentive reasons only, and any duplication is the cost of incentivizing effort. This contrasts with the motivation for the costly duplication that is also a feature common in the learning and experimentation literature. In this literature, additional signals increase the firm's knowledge about an unknown state and the firm acquires signals until the marginal benefit from better information is outweighed by the marginal cost of purchasing another signal. Thus, our paper provides a complementary rationale for costly duplication.
Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we characterize the optimal contract under full and partial commitment. We identify how limited liability and commitment influence key properties of the optimal contract, including the type of monitoring, the form of the wage structure, and the effectiveness of bundling in reducing rents and monitoring costs. The section concludes with comparative statics and asymptotic results as the job size grows large.
Preliminaries
Three or more workers never optimal. When workers are choosing high effort and truthfully reporting, hiring more than two workers has no impact on the probability that the firm takes the correct action and it increases the expected transfer. Therefore, in the optimal contract to enforce (σ, µ), the firm never hires more than two workers for any task. This holds independent of any assumptions on commitment or limited liability.
Lemma 1. In the optimal contract to enforce (σ, µ), Q j (n) = 0 for all n > 2 and j = 1, ..., J.
Proof. In Appendix.
Q.E.D.
Given Lemma 1, q is sufficient to describe the monitoring technology.
Benchmark: Unlimited Liability. As a benchmark, we derive the optimal contract when workers face unlimited liability. Unlimited liability allows the firm to punish workers with arbitrarily severe punishments. The firm sets W (r) < 0 for reports r that only occur under shirking profiles, ensuring that the expected payoff from any effort profile with shirking is negative. The optimal wage structure satisfies the worker's individual rationality constraint with equality on the equilibrium path, so workers do not earn any rents. Given this wage structure, virtual monitoring is optimal, and the optimal contract is virtually efficient. There is no benefit to bundling -virtual efficiency and zero rents are achieved independent of the job size. The optimal contract is the same under partial and full commitment.
Lemma 2 (Unlimited Liability). Assume Assumption 1. In the optimal contract under both partial and full commitment, the firm selects a job size of J = 1, virtual monitoring, and punishes mismatches,
This contract enforces (σ, µ) and satisfies IR and CC.
Proof. Omitted. Q.E.D.
Therefore, when there is no restriction on negative wages, neither unobservable effort nor partial commitment create inefficiencies.
Towards the Optimal Wage Structure
In this section, we derive the optimal wage structure for a fixed monitoring distribution and job size. With limited liability, using negative transfers to punish shirking is not possible. The firm must dissuade shirking by providing workers with rents. As in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , incentives are generated by the threat of losing these rents if caught deviating. Workers can guarantee themselves a positive payment by shirking on all tasks and sending a message to the firm as if they exerted effort and acquired informative signals. Therefore, any contract that satisfies the incentive constraint for high effort and truthful messages also satisfies individual rationality.
Under strategy (σ i , µ i ), the set of messages that a worker sends with positive probability is Ω J , with k := |Ω| J elements. Partition the set of reports into R M , in which the worker sends a message m ∈ Ω J and matches on all monitored tasks (this set includes profiles with tasks that are n monitored), and R N , in which a mismatch occurs on a monitored task or a worker sends a message m / ∈ Ω J . For example, if J = 1 and Ω = {0, 1}, then R M = {0, 1, 00, 11} and R N = {∅, 01, 10, ∅0, ∅1, 0∅, 1∅}.
When workers play (σ, µ), any r ∈ R N occurs with probability zero, g(R N |σ i , µ i ) = 0, since the probability of a mismatch or a message outside Ω J is zero. For any deviation (σ i , µ i ) = (σ i , µ i ), mismatches occur with positive probability, g(R N |σ i , µ i ) > 0. Therefore, it is never optimal to offer a positive transfer for a report in R N .
Lemma 3. Under Condition 1, the optimal wage structure satisfies W (r) = 0 ∀r ∈ R N .
Proof. Using the partition over reports, rewrite the incentive constraint as
lowers the left hand side of the incentive constraint, which is never optimal. Q.E.D.
Partition R M into {R (m)} m∈Ω J , where R(m) is the set of possible reports that occur with positive probability when a worker sends message m ∈ Ω J and workers play (σ, µ). This is the set of reports generated by message m, excluding mismatch reports. For example, if J = 1, then R(1) = {1, 11} and R(0) = {0, 00}. We say a wage structure W is simple if W (r) = 0 ∀r ∈ R N and for each message m ∈ Ω J , there exists a w > 0 such that for any report r ∈ R(m), W (r) ∈ {0, w}.
Definition 1 (Simple Wage Structure). A wage structure is simple if it can be represented as (w, ρ), where given k = |Ω| J , w = (w 1 , ..., w k ) ∈ R k + is a vector of wage payments and ρ = (ρ 1 , ..., ρ k ) is a vector of sets of reports with ρ j ⊂ R(m j ) for each m j ∈ Ω J , such that
In such a wage structure, the firm pays at most k + 1 different amounts, even though there are k + k 2 different reports in R M . Note that a simple wage structure satisfies limited liability and pays zero on r ∈ R N , as deemed optimal in Lemma 3. Let W ρ be the set of simple wage structures.
Fix ρ and consider deviations to always shirking,
. The following Lemma calculates the optimal vector of wage payments w(ρ) to deter this deviation. This vector is driven by the ratio of the probability of a report in ρ j under high effort and the probability of a report in ρ j under shirking and sending message m j .
Lemma 4. Fix a vector of reports ρ = (ρ 1 , ..., ρ k ), monitoring probability vector q and job size J. Then the optimal simple wage structure to deter deviations from high effort and truthful reporting to strategies {(σ 0 , m)} m∈S J is w(ρ) = (w 1 , ..., w k ), where
is the probability of a report in ρ j under strategy (σ i , µ i ) and
is the probability of a report in ρ j under strategy (σ 0 , m j ).
Note that w(ρ) only depends on q through the dependence of p j and x j on q. Therefore, the form of w(ρ) is independent of q.
The Optimal Contract: Full Commitment
We first derive the optimal wage structure for a fixed symmetric monitoring probability q and job size J. The characterization of the optimal wage structure proceeds as follows. We first calculate the optimal simple wage structure (w * , ρ * ) to deter deviations to the set of strategies in which a worker shirks on all tasks and sends a message in
. Given Lemma 4, this corresponds to characterizing the optimal ρ * , and setting w j = w j (ρ * ). We then show that (w * , ρ * ) also deters deviations to arbitrary strategy (σ i , µ i ) ∈ Σ i , which makes it optimal in the class of simple wage structures. Finally, we show that (w * , ρ * ) is optimal in the set of all wage structures with limited liability. Under full commitment, we do not need to worry about the firm's incentive to truthfully reveal reports to workers.
Given message m j , let R l (m j ) ⊂ R(m j ) be the set of reports where an agent is monitored and matches on l tasks, for l = 0, ..., J. For example, if J = 1 and Ω = {0, 1}, then R 0 (1) = {1}
and R 1 (1) = {11}. Note that R 0 (m j ) and R J (m j ) are singletons corresponding to the report with no monitoring and the report with monitoring and matching on all tasks.
Lemma 5 (Optimal Wage Structure). Suppose Conditions 1 and 2. Then the optimal wage structure to enforce (σ, µ) is simple. Given symmetric monitoring probability q and job size J, the optimal wage structure takes the form (ρ * , w(ρ * )), where
where R J (m) is the report in which an agent sends message m and is monitored and matches on all tasks, and f J (m) is the probability of observing signal m. For report r ∈ ρ * j , W (r) = w j (ρ * j ) and for r / ∈ ρ * , W (r) = 0.
Lemma 5 establishes that the optimal wage structure is simple and takes the form of paying the worker a large positive wage when the worker is monitored and matches on all tasks, and otherwise paying the worker a wage of zero. For example, if the worker is assigned 10 tasks, and is monitored and matches on all 10, the worker is paid a positive wage. But if the worker is monitored and matches on 9 or fewer tasks, or has any mismatches, the worker is paid nothing.
When the worker is paid a positive wage, this wage is inversely proportional to the likelihood of the observed state profile m, Π J (m), which is the realized state for each task in the worker's job. 15 For example, observing a less likely state profile corresponds to a higher wage payment.
If the firm has full commitment, then it puts the risk of monitoring on the worker, and pays a large wage when the worker is monitored and matches on all tasks. The ratio of the probability of a report when a worker works and shirks is highest for the report corresponding to monitoring the worker on all tasks. Given a message m j , R J (m j ) is the only report r in which g(r|σ i , µ i ) = g(r|σ 0 , m j ); for all other reports r ∈ R(m j ), g(r|σ i , µ i ) < g(r|σ 0 , m j ). Therefore, paying a positive wage only on R J (m j ) generates the strongest incentives. The workers receive a higher wage for identifying tasks that are the less likely state, in order to make all deviations to no effort and a given message profile equally profitable across all messages.
In any feasible wage structure to enforce high effort and truthful reporting, the following conditions must be met:
1. For each m j ∈ Ω J , there exists a report r ∈ r (m j ) such that W (r) > 0. If not, then a worker would never report m j .
2. For each task t, there exists a report r with W (r) > 0 such that a worker is monitored and matches on task t. If not, then a worker would never exert effort and report truthfully on task t.
Note that (ρ * , w(ρ * )) satisfies these properties.
Next, we derive the optimal symmetric monitoring technology. In a high effort and truthful message equilibrium, the firm learns the true state for each task under any contract that satisfies the worker's incentive constraint. Any incentive compatible contract provides the firm with the same information, and the firm chooses the optimal contract to minimize the cost of acquiring this information. Therefore, the optimal monitoring rate is determined by minimizing the firm's expected per task wage bill. It balances the cost and benefit of more frequent monitoringmore workers hired per task versus potentially lower required wage payments per worker.
The expected wage bill for a worker is
Note this is independent of q. In order to generate monitoring probability q, by Condition 4, the expected number of workers hired for each task is 1 + q 2−q . Each worker is paid
per task. 16 Therefore, the expected per task wage bill is
where the endogenous per task cost of monitoring at rate q depends on the wage structure and the probability a second worker is hired,
The firm's optimal monitoring rate and job size minimizes Equation 3. Equation 3 is increasing in q and decreasing in J. Therefore, the firm chooses the smallest monitoring rate possiblevirtual monitoring -and bundles the maximum number of tasks.
Theorem 1 (Optimal Contract: Full Commitment). Assume 1 and Conditions 1 and 2. In the optimal contract, the firm uses a symmetric virtual monitoring technology, maximal bundling and the simple wage profile characterized in Lemma 5. For any ε > 0 and set of feasible monitoring structures Q(ε), this corresponds to J * = J, Q * = (ε, ..., ε), and W * = (w(ρ(ε, J)), ρ(ε, J)).
This contract enforces (σ, µ).
Proof. Follows immediately from the above characterization of the expected wage bill and
Given monitoring technology Q * = (ε, ..., ε), and Condition 4, the optimal task strategy is η(1) = 2(1 − ε)/(2 − ε), η(2) = ε/(2 − ε) and η(n) = 0 ∀n ≥ 3. The firm follows the workers' messages, A t = m t for all t.
Comparative Statics. The per-task wage for each report and the expected wage payment per worker is decreasing in the maximum job size. Increasing the job size strengthens the effect of bundling: shirking becomes less attractive since the worker needs to produce acceptable output for more tasks. As the prior becomes more extreme, a worker is more likely to match when shirking and sending the message corresponding to the more likely state, and therefore must be paid a higher wage to deter this deviation. Therefore, the wage for the more likely states increases and the expected wage payment per worker increases. The following Corollary outlines comparative statics on the optimal wage.
Corollary 1 (Comparative Statics: Wage). Assume Conditions 1 and 2 and let W * be the optimal wage structure.
2. The expected wage payment per worker is decreasing in Ω π(ω) and decreasing inJ.
Proof. The claims follow immediately from the wage derived in Lemma 5. Q.E.D.
The optimal monitoring probability decreases withJ. The direct effect of increasingJ on the expected wage payment dominates the indirect effect of decreasing the optimal monitoring rate q * . Therefore, it is optimal to hire fewer workers for each task and pay each worker a lower per-task wage. Taken together, the rents that the firm pays to a worker vanish asJ → ∞ (see 
Proof. The claims follow immediately from the expected wage bill in Theorem 1, which is
The firm can always choose the state that is more likely, given the prior, instead of hiring workers. Theorem 1 implies there exist effort costs for which the firm would delegate tasks if effort is contractible but not when effort is non-contractible.
Corollary 3 (No Trade).
There exists a v such that for values v ∈ [1/(1 −π), v), the firm will not delegate tasks despite it being efficient to do so.
Proof. See Appendix. Q.E.D.
The Optimal Contract: Partial Commitment
If the firm only has partial commitment, then it cannot use the wage structure described above.
Partial commitment translates to a condition on the monotonicity of the transfer function with respect to reports. Recall that a report r is a subset of r if, fixing an individual's message, it can be created by removing other messages from r. Given a report r, the firm must pay a weakly higher transfer on all reports that are a subset of r; otherwise, it would have an incentive to hide evidence of monitoring and make the lower payment. Therefore, the firm cannot credibly commit to pay more on a report r than on a report r ⊂ r. Anticipating this, a worker would only exert high effort and report truthfully if it was incentive compatible to do so, given the firm's revelation strategy.
For example, a report from two agents that contains a mismatch is verifiably different from a report with no mismatch, and thus the firm can produce evidence to distinguish these reports.
But a report with one message is not verifiably different from a report with two messages, as the firm could hide the message from the second agent. Therefore, the firm cannot commit to pay more on the report with two messages, as it would have an incentive to hide the second message and pay the worker a lower wage.
As in the full commitment case, we first derive the optimal wage structure for a fixed symmetric monitoring probability q and job size J. The method to establish the optimal wage structure is similar to Lemma 5, with the additional requirement that W (r ) ≥ W (r) for all r ⊂ r.
Lemma 6. Assume Conditions 1 and 3. Then the optimal wage structure to enforce (σ, µ) is simple. Given symmetric monitoring probability q and job size J, the optimal wage structure takes the form (ρ * , w(ρ * )), where
where R(m) is the set of reports in which an agent sends message m and matches on all tasks on which he is monitored, x * j = g(R(m j )|σ 0 , m j ) is the probability of a report in R(m j ) when the agent shirks and sends message m j , and f J (m) is the probability of observing signal m. For report r ∈ ρ * j , W (r) = w j (ρ * j ) and for r / ∈ ρ * , W (r) = 0.
Lemma 6 establishes that the optimal wage structure is simple and takes the form of paying the worker the same wage on any profile in which the worker matches on any task on which he is monitored, regardless of the number of monitored tasks, and otherwise paying the worker a wage of zero. For example, if the worker is assigned 2 tasks, the worker is paid a positive wage if he is monitored on no tasks, is monitored and matches on 1 task, or is monitored and matches on both tasks, while if the worker has any mismatches, the worker is paid nothing.
When the worker is paid a positive wage, this wage is inversely proportional to the likelihood that the worker matches on all monitored tasks when the worker shirks and reports m. In other words, the worker is paid more for reports which he is less likely to generate when shirking. This wage will be lower than the wage for the same message under full commitment, but the firm will pay this wage with higher probability. As in the case of full commitment, workers receive a higher wage for identifying tasks that correspond to less likely state profiles. Under partial commitment, the firm cannot put the risk of monitoring on the worker. The difference between the probability of a report in R l under working and shirking is increasing in l, and the partial commitment requirement is binding for the firm.
Under partial commitment, this depends on q. A higher monitoring rate q lowers the expected wage bill for a worker, since it lowers the required wage payment for each message that receives a positive wage, and therefore lowers the rents paid to each worker.
However, as in the case of full commitment, a higher monitoring rate raises the expected number of workers hired per task, and therefore increases the inefficiency of a contract. In order to generate monitoring probability q on each task, by Condition 4, the expected number of workers hired for each task is 1 + q 2−q . A higher monitoring rate q raises the expected number of workers hired, creating a larger inefficiency.
The expected per task wage bill is
The optimal monitoring rate balances the trade-off between the wage payments to the workers and efficiency loss from monitoring by minimizing (4).
Theorem 2 characterize the optimal contract.
Theorem 2 (Optimal Contract: Partial Commitment). Assume 1 and Conditions 1 and 3.
In the optimal contract, the firm uses a symmetric stochastic monitoring technology, maximal bundling and the simple wage profile characterized in Lemma 6. This corresponds to J * = J, Q * = (q * , ..., q * ), and W * = (w(ρ(q * , J)), ρ(q * , J)), where q * > 0 minimizes (4) when J =J.
This contract enforces (σ, µ).
Given monitoring technology Q * = (q * , ..., q * ) and Condition 4, the optimal task strategy is η(1) = 2(1 − q * )/(2 − q * ), η(2) = q * /(2 − q * ) and η(n) = 0 ∀n ≥ 3. The firm follows the workers' messages, A t = m t for all t.
The optimal monitoring probability will be strictly positive, and depends on the prior over states and the maximum job size. Bundling significantly improves incentives for the firm, in that it both reduces the efficiency loss from monitoring and the rents captured by workers from limited liability. Therefore, the firm will bundle as many tasks together as possible.
Let C(q) denote the per task cost of monitoring at rate q on all tasks. The equilibrium cost of monitoring is endogenously determined by the optimal wage structure and monitoring rate
and is strictly positive under partial commitment.
Corollary 4 (Costly Monitoring). Under Conditions 1 and 3, the equilibrium cost of monitoring is C(q * ) > 0.
Proof. Follows immediately from q * > 0.
Comparative Statics. The optimal monitoring probability increases as the prior becomes more skewed and decreases as the maximum job size grows. See Figure 2 .
Corollary 5 (Comparative Statics: Monitoring Rate). Assume Conditions 1 and 3. Then q * (π,J) is increasing in Ω π(ω) and decreasing inJ.
Proof. The claims follow immediately from Lemma 6 and Theorem 2.
Q.E.D.
A more skewed prior increases the likelihood that a shirker will match when monitored, and the firm monitors at a higher rate to reduce the rents captured by workers. Monitoring and bundling are substitutes: when more tasks are assigned to a worker, each task can be monitored less intensively. This contrasts with the optimal contract with full commitment, in which the optimal monitoring technology (virtual monitoring) is independent of the prior and job size.
Similar comparative statics for the wage hold as in the case of full commitment.
Virtual monitoring is optimal asymptotically as the number of assigned tasks becomes large.
Therefore, the efficiency loss relative to the contractible effort benchmark vanishes and the optimal contract is asymptotically efficient.
Corollary 6 (Asymptotic Efficiency). Assume Conditions 1 and 3. In the limit, virtual monitoring is optimal,
and the optimal contract is efficient.
Q.E.D. 
Discussion
Rahman (2012) examines when virtual monitoring is feasible for the firm. In our setting, virtual monitoring is always feasible. For any job size the firm can approximate the action profile of the efficient contract with a single worker, provided there are no upper bound on transfers. However, this is achieved at great cost: wage payments are unboundedly large. With unlimited monitoring risk, the probability of paying these large wage payments shrinks proportionally, so that the expected wage payment is independent of the monitoring probability. However, with limited monitoring risk, the probability of paying a positive wage for a given message is independent of the monitoring probability, while the required wage payment becomes unboundedly large as the monitoring probability shrinks. The firm can obtain higher expected payoffs by monitoring with a strictly positive probability.
Workers are treated symmetrically, as are tasks within a worker's job. Intuitively, monitoring technologies with asymmetric monitoring probabilities either across tasks or workers make inefficient use of the firm's monitoring ability, since the expected wage payment at the optimal wage structure is convex in q. Given any asymmetric monitoring technology Q = (q 1 , ..., q J ), there exists another monitoring technology Q = (q, ..., q) that pays the same expected wage per worker but hires fewer workers in expectation. Similarly, given two different contracts with monitoring technologies Q 1 and Q 2 , there exists another monitoring technology Q that hires the same expected number of workers but pays a lower average expected wage per worker.
Bundling presents the firm another option when negative punishments are unavailable. Instead of a costly bonus on top of the worker's earnings, the reward is simply the receipt of the wages the worker accumulated throughout the job. By bundling multiple tasks together into one job, the firm is able to withhold the worker's earnings until the entire job is successfully completed, and this helps to relax the limited liability constraint. Bundling plays a larger role here than simply scaling up the firm's available rewards and punishments; bundling multiple tasks together reduces the per-task cost of monitoring. The firm's problem is non-linear in the number of tasks it assigns to a worker because of the role played by bundling in the optimal monitoring technology.
Bundling takes the form of assigning a worker multiple tasks and conditioning payment for any single task on satisfactory performance for all tasks. An alternative interpretation of bundling is provided by considering multidimensional tasks. Suppose an agent is assigned a task with multiple components. For example, a worker must complete a tax return with additional schedules for each source of non-wage income. The tasks of Section 3 are now individual tax forms and a job is the entire tax return. Theorem 1 suggests that the Internal Revenue Service should jointly monitor all tax forms and impose the harshest possible penalty upon uncovering any irregularities. There is evidence the IRS follows such a strategy. Tax returns claiming unusually large charitable deductions, Schedule C self-employment income or business expenses often lead to an audit of the entire return (Barrett 2011; CBSNews 2010 ).
An entertaining example of bundling incentives on multidimensional tasks is provided by the rock band Van Halen. Like many musical acts, the band's performance contract with event venues is a long, complicated document specifying hundreds of individual items. Within the 53-page rider is an obscure provision often taken as prima facie evidence of rock excess: a bowl of M&M's is to be provided with all brown candies removed. As the band's lead signer explained in his autobiography, the unusual request performed a monitoring function:
Van Halen was the first band to take huge productions into tertiary, third-level markets. We'd pull up with nine eighteen-wheeler trucks, full of gear, where the standard was three trucks, max. And there were many, many technical errors [...] The contract rider read like a version of the Chinese Yellow Pages because there was so much equipment, and so many human beings to make it function. So just as a little test [...] in the middle of nowhere, was: "There will be no brown M&M's in the backstage area, upon pain of forfeiture of the show, with full compensation."
So, when I would walk backstage, if I saw a brown M&M in that bowl ... well, line-check the entire production (Roth 1997, pp. 97-98) .
A Crowdsourcing Application
Binary Contract
Suppose the firm can only choose to accept or reject a worker's output. The firm can choose how to divide the set of reports into acceptance and rejection sets, and must pay the same transfer for all reports in each set.
Condition 5 (Binary Transfers). There exists a partition {R A , R R } of R such that W (r) = W (r ) ∀r, r ∈ R A and W (r) = W (r ) ∀r, r ∈ R R .
In this case, the optimal contract is as follows.
Theorem 3. Suppose the wage structure must satisfy limited liability, limited risk and binary transfers. Given monitoring probability q, the optimal wage structure that enforces high effort and truthful reporting is
The Gold Standard
Suppose the firms seeds each worker's job with tasks for which the state is known. Such practice is used in crowdsourcing, where it's known as the "Gold Standard." 17 We show that gold standard contracts are not optimal here. Suppose that the firm has a set of tasks for which it knows the state. 18 Workers are assigned J tasks and the firm optimizes over how many known tasks to include within this set; let n be the optimal number. A worker's job is judged on the basis of the worker's performance on the subset of known tasks. Payment is provided if and only if the worker performs satisfactorily on all n known tasks. A worker must be compensated for the cost of effort on all J tasks, as well as receive whatever rents are required to dissuade shirking. Let w G denote the optimal wage profile. The firm is paying each worker w G in equilibrium and is learning the state of J − n new tasks. So with 2J tasks assigned to two workers, the cost is 2w G while the benefit is 2(J − n).
Alternatively, the firm could have the two workers overlap (i.e. be monitored) on n of the J assigned tasks. The wage that incentivizes effort is the same, so the expected wage bill will be the same as in the Gold Standard contract, 2w G . But now the firm is learning the state for J + J − n = 2J − n > 2J − 2n new tasks. The same wage bill is spread over a greater number of new tasks using a contract based on the results in Section 4. Gold standard contracts are inefficient because they monitor workers independently, compared to the optimal contract in Section 4, which jointly monitor workers. This advantage is reduced as J grows large.
6 Other Extensions
Asymmetric Firm Payoffs
The optimal contract is unchanged if the firm's payoffs are asymmetric: only the firm's participation constraint changes. Suppose the firm's payoffs are asymmetric across states and actions.
Let α ω ≥ 0 be the firm's payoff from matching the state when the state is ω and β ω ≤ 0 be the firm's payoff from failing to match state ω. For example, in an image screening task, α 1 (β 1 ) corresponds to permitting (prohibiting) the sharing of harmless content and α 0 (β 0 )
17 For example, see www.crowdflower.com. 18 In actuality, it would be costly to assemble a set of known tasks, but we assume that cost is zero, as it is the least restrictive type of Gold Standard contract to compare to our previous results.
represents removing (failing to remove) an objectionable item. The optimal contract is determined by (π,J) and is independent of the firm's payoff. With payoffs α ω and β ω , the firm's expected payoff from selecting A t = 0 (A t = 1) without hiring any workers is (1 − π)α 0 + πβ 1 ((1 − π)β 0 + πα 1 ). The value of the proposed contract must exceed both of these values in order for the firm to participate.
Generalized Tasks
Similar logic extends Theorem 1 for the case of heterogeneously distributed tasks. Suppose instead that for each task t the prior belief is π t = P r(ω t = 1) and that the firm hires an additional worker for t with probability q t . The incentive compatible wage profile is determined by modifying Theorem 1. Consider a monitoring technology (q 1 , ..., q J ). Now suppose
for some task t. This cannot be optimal since the firm could lower the monitoring probability on task t -thereby increasing
-without affecting incentives.
∀t. This defines the monitoring probability on task t in terms of parameters and the monitoring probability on any other task. The optimal incentive organization is determined by the system
, for t = 1, ..., J q t ∈ (0, 1], for t = 1, ..., J.
The constraints allow the firm to treat this multivariate optimization problem as a univariate problem. For π j > π k , q j > q k : the firm monitors more intensively when the prior is more pronounced, which parallels the finding in Section 4.
Noisy Signals
In Section 3, effort perfectly reveals the state for each task. Suppose that signals are imperfect but sufficiently precise so that in the contractible effort benchmark the firm still wants to hire a single worker. In the perfect signal model, workers always produce matching messages and obtain payment with certainty in equilibrium. This is not the case with imperfect signals. Even if all workers exert effort, workers sometimes send different messages for the same task.
There are three levers the firm can use to introduce leniency into the contract. It can set a more tolerant match rate for reports, it can bundle fewer tasks in each job or it can monitor each task less intensively. The effect of each lever is the same: a worker is able to produce matching output on fewer tasks and still receive a positive wage. For sufficiently precise signals, the firm finds it optimal to monitor less frequently, and otherwise the optimal contract is similar to Section 4. Incentive concerns push the firm to inefficiently hire multiple workers for a single task. The firm now receives an additional (small) learning benefit from hiring these additional workers. The firm does not pay on mismatched reports and bundles as many tasks together as possible.
Conclusion
New information technology permits firms and workers to interact through spot labor markets.
Compared to conventional labor markets, spot markets offer significant advantages for a firm.
A flexible and scalable workforce is available to start work immediately and no preexisting relationship with a worker is presumed nor is the promise of a continuing relationship required.
The minimal interaction between the firm and its employees raises new challenges. The firm must provide adequate supervision to ensure workers are acting faithfully on its behalf.
Workers are compensated for their effort, but the exertion of effort is costly and unobservable.
Furthermore, the quality of a worker's output cannot be verified directly.
With traditional reputation mechanisms inapplicable and the threat of large penalties for poor performance unavailable, the firm creates incentives for effort by periodically hiring additional workers to duplicate some of the tasks it has already assigned. Wages are then made contingent upon satisfactory performance on all tasks.
The firm's monitoring technology is endogenously determined to balance the costs and benefits of supervision. Employing monitors more frequently keeps wages down but leads to greater duplication of assignments. In the optimal organization of incentives, the firm bundles multiple tasks together for each worker. Monitoring and bundling are strategic substitutes: as the firm assigns more tasks to each worker, it monitors each task less frequently. 
A Crowdsoucing
This section provides a brief overview of the crowdsourcing labor spot market. Crowdsourcing Field experiments carried out on AMT suggest workers respond to economic incentives in a predictable fashion (Horton and Chilton 2010; Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser in press; Mason and Watts 2009; Paolacci, Chandler, and Ipeirotis 2010) . Explicitly informing workers that the accuracy of their responses was being measured and used to determine whether payment for their work would be provided had no discernible effect on either the quality or quantity of output: participants appear to treat their pay as necessarily performance dependent. Several Hiring multiple workers is probably the most common method of quality assurance (Mason and Suri 2012) . (The job in Figure 3 states "we [the firm] verify ALL answers.") Obtaining multiple responses is cost-efficient for many tasks on AMT. It also tends to perform well (Snow, O'Connor, Jurafsky, and Ng 2008) . Another option, known as the "Gold Standard," is built around the idea of including tasks within each job for which the firm already knows the correct answer. A worker's performance can then be judged on the subset of these tasks. 21
20 Horton, Rand, and Zeckhauser (in press ) and Suri and Watts (2011) recreate laboratory experiments on AMT and find no significant differences between the settings.
21 Little, Chilton, Goldman, and Miller (2010) find that for tasks with clearly unreasonable answers, firms can effectively vet the responses of workers by employing additional agents for judgement. The additional agents verify whether the first worker provided a coherent response to the question.
B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Follows immediately from the worker's incentive constraint and the fact that the firm learns the state, independent of the number of workers, in any high effort and truthful message equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary ρ = (ρ 1 , ..., ρ k ). Let p j = g(ρ j |σ i , µ i ) be the probability of a report in set ρ j under strategy (σ i , µ i ) and let x j = g(ρ j |σ 0 ,m j ) be the probability of a report in set ρ j under the strategy (σ 0 ,m j ). Note that g(ρ j |σ 0 , m l ) = 0 for all l = j. Let p = (p 1 , ..., p k ) and x = (x 1 , ..., x k ) be the corresponding vectors. The incentive constraint to prevent deviating to
and J = (J, ..., J). Note the diagonal entries are negative, p j − x j ≤ 0. Rewrite the set of incentive constraints as ∆ · w T ≥ J and satisfy it with equality by setting
Summing each row and multiplying by J/d yields:
For a given ρ, this characterizes the vector of wages that satisfies the set of incentive constraints for deviations to σ 0 and sending a message m ∈ Ω J . Obviously, for any σ i , sending a message m / ∈ Ω J is never an optimal deviation, since W (r) = 0 for any report generated by m / ∈ Ω J .
Therefore, w satisfies the set of incentive constraints for all deviations to strategies {(σ 0 , m)}.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemmas 5 and 6. The proof proceeds by a series of lemmas.
Lemma 7. Given w(ρ), the optimal structure ρ * to deter deviations to strategies
is:
Proof. The optimal ρ is the set of reports that minimize the expected wage bill for a worker.
The wage vector w and vectors of probabilities p and x depend on ρ; write w(ρ), p(ρ) and x(ρ) to capture this dependence. Given ρ, the expected wage bill for a single worker is
where p j ≤ x j . Minimizing the expected wage bill is equivalent to maximizing
Case 1: Full commitment Suppose ρ j = R J (m j ), the report where an agent is monitored and matches on all tasks. If 22 The lower bound is derived from only including reports with no monitoring in ρ, which yields
, and upper bound from achieving pj = xj.
a worker plays strategy (σ i , µ i ), then the probability of report R J (m j ) is the probability of message m j , f J (m j ), times the probability of being monitored on all tasks, q J , times the probability of matching on all tasks conditional on playing m j , 1. Therefore,
If a worker plays strategy (σ 0 ,m j ), then the probability of report R J (m j ) is the probability of message m j , 1, times the probability of being monitored on all tasks, q J , times the probability of matching on all tasks conditional on playing m j , f J (m j ). Therefore, x j = q J f J (m j ). Hence,
uniquely holds for ρ j = R J (m j ). The optimal ρ j for message m j is ρ * j = R J (m j ), and the optimal structure is ρ * = (R J (m 1 ), ..., R J (m k )).
Case 2: Partial commitment
Partial commitment requires that for any r ∈ ρ j , any r ⊂ r, r ∈ ρ j . There must be at least one report r ∈ ρ j , otherwise it is not possible to incentivize a worker to play message m j . Let r ∈ R 0 (m j ). Then r ⊆ r for all r ∈ R(m j ). Given ρ j = ∅, partial commitment requires
Suppose ρ j = R 0 (m j ), the minimal set in which it is possible to satisfy partial commitment.
Suppose r 1 ∈ R 1 (m j ). Let m j1 be the element of m j which is monitored in report r 1 . Then
and adding r 1 to ρ j would increase p j /x j without violating partial commitment, given r 1 has a unique subset r ∈ R 0 (m j ), which is already in ρ j . Therefore ρ j = R 0 (m j ) ∪ {r 1 } is strictly preferred to ρ j .
Let R 2 (m j )| r 1 = {r 2 ∈ R 2 (m j ) : r 1 ⊂ r 2 }. This is the set of reports that it is possible to add to ρ j without violating partial commitment. Comparing ρ j and
and adding R 1 \ {r 1 } ∪ R 2 | r 1 to ρ j would increase p j /x j and still satisfy partial commitment.
Therefore ρ j is strictly preferred to ρ j .
Similar logic establishes ρ l+1 j = ∪ l n=0 R n ∪R l+1 | r 1 is strictly preferred to ρ l j = ∪ l−1 n=0 R n ∪R l | r 1 for all l < J and satisfies partial commitment, where
is preferred to any other set of reports containing r 1 . This holds for all r 1 ∈ R 1 (m j ). Therefore, the optimal set of reports for message m j is ρ * j = R(m j ), and the optimal structure is ρ * = (R(m 1 ), ..., R(m k )). 24 Q.E.D.
Lemma 8. The optimal structure (ρ * , w(ρ * )) to deter deviations to strategies {(σ 0 ,m j )} k j=1
also satisfies the incentive constraint for deviating to any strategy (σ i , µ i ) ∈ Σ i , and is therefore optimal in W ρ .
Proof. This establishes that (ρ * , w(ρ * )) deters deviations to any pure strategy (σ i , m i ). Therefore, (ρ * , w(ρ * )) deters deviations to any strategy (σ i , µ i ) ∈ Σ i .
Given that any wage structure must deter deviations to
, and the optimal way to deter deviations to {(σ 0 ,m j )} k j=1 also deters deviations to any strategy (σ i , µ i ) ∈ Σ i , (ρ * , w(ρ * )) is the optimal wage structure in W ρ .
Lemma 9. The structure (ρ * , w(ρ * )) is optimal in the class of all wage structures with limited liability.
Proof. Consider a wage structure where the firm does not pay the same amount on all reports with a positive wage in the set R(m j ). In the case of unlimited risk, it follows immediately from the optimal ρ * that paying a positive wage on any reports r ∈ R(m j ) \ R J (m j ) will weaken the incentive constraint for deviations to strategies {(σ 0 ,m j )} k j=1 and is therefore not optimal. In the case of partial commitment, the firm would like to pay less on reports R(m j ) \ R J (m j ) but the partial commitment constraint binds. Therefore, it is never optimal to pay more on such reports.
24 It is more straight forward to establish that g(R0|σ, µ) g(R0|σ0,mj) < g(R0 ∪ R1|σ, µ) g(R0 ∪ R1|σ0,mj) < ... < g(∪ Rn for all l < J. Adding r ∈ R l+1 to ρj will not violate partial commitment, as for any r ⊂ r, r ∈ ρj. However, under skewed priors, it is possible that adding a single report from R l+1 is better than adding the whole set, g(ρj ∪ {r} |σ, µ) g(ρj ∪ {r} |σ0,mj) > g(ρ j |σ, µ) g(ρ j |σ0,mj) for some r ∈ R l+1 , so this doesn't establish the optimality of ρj = ∪ J n=0 Rn across all sets of reports that satisfy partial commitment.
Proof. Given this, p * j = f J (m j ) which is independent of q and Proof of Theorem 2. Symmetry follows from Lemma 10. The optimal monitoring rate and wage structure follows directly from Lemma 6 and the ensuing characterization of the optimal wage bill.
Lemma 10 (Monitor Symmetrically Across Tasks). For any monitoring technology q = (q 1 , ..., q J ) with q j = q k for some j, k, there exists another monitoring technologyq = (q, ..., q) that enforces high effort and truthful reporting for the same expected wage per worker, but results in hiring a lower expected number of workers.
The incentive constraint requires
for all strategies σ i that specify shirking on exactly n = 0, ..., J tasks. Since P r(R i ) = 1, the required transfer is governed by P r(R i ), which itself depends on the firm's implementation plan.
Let Q = (q 1 , ..., q J ) be given and consider strategy σ i in which i shirks on n tasks and the firm's monitoring probability on each such task is q k , k = 1, ..., n. Then P r(R i ) = .
For any collection of monitoring probabilities (q 1 , ..., q J ), the firm can set a uniform monitoring probability q such that P r(R i ) is the same. In other words, there exists q such that 1 − q + 2qπ 1 + q n = 1 − q 1 + 2q 1 π 1 + q 1 · ... · 1 − q n + 2q n π 1 + q n .
Formally,
1−q+2qπ 1+q
is the geometric mean of .
The firm cares about the expected wage bill. For each task t, 1 + q t workers are being paid in expectation, so the firm expects to pay J + J k=1 q k workers in total. Suppose under implementation plan Q = (q 1 , ..., q J ), q 1 > q 2 , so that is decreasing and concave in q t , the geometric-mean-preserving scrunch in which q 1 is decreased and q 2 is increased permits q 1 to fall by more than q 2 rises. Thus, the sum J k=1 q k decreases. The implementation plan resulting from the scrunch provides the same transfer and discourages shirking exactly as effectively as before. But since it has reduced the expected number of workers hired, it results in a lower expected wage bill. The firm's optimal implementation plan must then be of the formQ = (q, ..., q) specifying a constant monitoring probability q ∈ [0, 1].
B.1 Additional Proofs
Proof of Corollary 3 The claims follows from the inefficiency of the optimal contract. The firm is willing to pay the equivalent per-task wage w * (q, π, J) instead of hiring no worker only if v −
(1 + q) 1 − (1 − q + qπ) J ≥ vπ.
The left-hand side gives the firm's expected per-task payoff from the proposed contract while the right-hand side is the firm's expected per-task payoff from guessing the state. This condition is equivalent to
When effort is contractible, the firm prefers to hire a worker if v ≥ 1/(1 − π). Note c < 1 − π.
Thus, for effort costs c ∈ (c, 1 − π] the firm will not employ any workers when effort is not contractible, even though it is optimal to do so when effort is contractible.
Proof of Corollary 6 Let (π, c) be given. The dependence of the monitoring probability on these parameters will often be suppressed. Denote ν = 1−q+2qπ 1+q . Rearranging Equation 6, the optimal monitoring probability q must satisfy
Denote the left-hand side of Equation 5 as f (J, q(J)) and treat J as a continuous variable.
(The firm's problem is well-defined for J ∈ R + and all relevant objects are monotonic in J.)
The partial derivative of f with respect to J is
. The sign of this derivative is governed by 1 − ν J + J ln(ν) ≡ 1 − x + ln(x) where x = ν J . The sum 1 − x + ln(x) is increasing over x ∈ (0, 1], so it is increasing in ν J . Since lim x→1 1 − x + ln(x) = 0, 1 − ν J + ln(ν J ) is negative. Thus, the partial derivative of f with respect to J, Π J , is less than 0. The partial derivative of f with respect to q, f q , is also negative. Implicit differentiation holds q J = −Π J fq , which shows the optimal monitoring probability is decreasing in the job size.
Since q * (J) ≡ q * (π, c, J) is decreasing in J and bounded below,q = lim J→∞ q * (J) exists.
To see that the limiting monitoring probability is zero, suppose otherwise thatq > 0. Define ν * (J) = 1−q * (J)+2πq * (J) 1+q * (J)
. Sinceq exists,ν = lim J→∞ ν * (J) exists.
which is positive. (The expression 1 − ν x + ν x ln(ν x ) is decreasing in ν, but it is still positive as ν x → 1 from below.)
The transfer must be large enough to dissuade shirking on all tasks, so
Proof of Theorem 3 The firm will select the lowest transfer capable of inducing effort on all tasks. Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 establish properties of the optimal contract. For any implementation plan Q i = (q, ..., q), the transfer scheme specifies W i (r i ) = Let (π, c, J) be given and maximize this payoff with respect to q. To simplify notation,
be the probability of producing acceptable output on any task when shirking.
Note that ν ∈ [π, 1] is decreasing over q = 0 to q = 1. The first-order condition stipulates 
When J = 1, ν = π satisfies Equation 6, so q * (π, c, 1) = 1.
Suppose J > 1. When q = 0, the left-hand side of Equation 6 is positive. It is negative when q = 1. To see this, note that the left-hand side reduces to −2Jπ J+1 +2Jπ J +2π J+1 −2π at q = 1.
This expression is less than zero for −Jπ J + Jπ J−1 + π J < 1. The sum −Jπ J + Jπ J−1 + π J is strictly increasing in π and equals unity at π = 1, so it is less than unity for π < 1. Thus, the left-hand side of Equation 6 is negative when q = 1 for any π < 1. Since Equation 6 is continuous in q, it is satisfied with equality at some interior q * by application of the intermediate value theorem. The second-order condition assures q * identifies the unique maximum of the firm's optimization problem.
